The role of regulation and commitment in the development of telecommunications in Chile by Galal, Ahmed & DEC
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1278
Regulation  The private sector  won't
invest in asset-specific  activities
and Commitment  in telecommunications  unless
in the Development  there  is  a well-designed,
clearly  delineated  set  of
of Telecommunications  regulations as  well as
mechanisms  for conflict
in Chile  resolution. At the same  time,
for regulatory reform to
Ahmed  Gala!  succeed  and be credible, it
must have  the support  of the
private sector  and be
consistent  with the country's
political  and judicial systems.
The World  Bank
Policy  Research  Department

















































































































dLCA  RESEARCH WORKING  PAPER  1278
Summary findings
Over six decades, Chile experimented  with three  Galal conclude, that regulatory rules on pricing, entrv,
regulatory regimes and ownership patterns for its  and conflict resolution mechanisms are critical for
telecommunications sectors, each with radically different  investing in such asset-specific utilities as telecommu-
investment patterns.  nications. More important,  the outcome of regulatory
Until 1970, Chile relied on private ownership and  reform depends on a match between reform and both the
rate-of-return regulation, but excess demand persisted.  prevailing political and judicial systems and intcrest-
In the  1970s, Chile relied on public ownership of two  group politics
regulated monopolies, but the sector grew even more  According to Galal, Chile satisfactorily resolved the
slowly than before.  two contracting problems in the  1980s. Chile's new
After 1982, Chile deregulated some market segments,  regulations are reasonably efficient and very specific
introduced benchmark regulation, and returned to  about how tariffs are to be calculated, how entry is to be
private ownership. The new regulatory regime and  governed, and how conflicts are to be resolved. The rules
privatization doubled the number of lines in service in  are embodied in a law that is relatively difficult to change
only four years.  (because the legislature is multiple-party)  and easy to
Galal explains investment behavior as a function of the  enforce (because the judicial system is independent). The
solutions to two contracting problems: betweer  inmpetus  for reform came from the emergence of a new
government and the firm, and between government and  private entrepreneurial class, whose growth dcpends on
interest groups.  modern telecommunications services.
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I.  IntroductiGn
Chile has experimented  with several types of regulatory  regimes  and ownership  patterns of its
telecommunications  sector, with radically  different results.  Between  1930  and 1970, firms were
privately owned and regulated  through specific  contracts. The sector only grew modestly  after
the initial fulfillment  of agreed investment  obligations. In the 1970s,  the country relied on public
ownership  of the two firms providing  the local and long-distance  services  as regulated
monopolies. The sector grew even slower  than before. Aftei 1982, Chile deregulated  certain
segments  of the sector, improved  its regulation  of others, and returned  to private ownership.
While this episode  is still evolving,  the gains to society  have been substantial:  new lines in
service doubled  in just four years, unmet demand has been declining  fast, new services  are being
introduced, and modern  technology  is replacing  old.  Why was this last episode  so much more
successful  than the others?
This paper explores  that question,  especially  with respect to the role played by regulation  and
government  commitment  not to expropriate  assets or quasi-rent. Though attention  is paid to the
specific  features and influence  of the regvllatory  regimes (e.g., pricing, entry), the focus is on
how institutional  factors affected  the credibility  of government  commitment  not to behave
opportunistically,  and the distributional  demands  of various interest groups. The analysis
attempts  to demonstrate  that efficient  development  of the telecommunications  sector depends on
the proper match of regulation  and country's prevailing  institutions.
Three questions  guide the analysis:
*  What was the nature of the contracting  arrangements  between  government  and
telecommunications  firms in Chile over time-to  what extent did these contracts  clearly spell out
efficient  pricing rules, entry policy, and conflict  resolution  mechanisms?
*  Given the answer to the first question,  did the sector respond  as expected-did  the
immnediate  incentives  provided  by these contracts  persuade  firms to commit  themselves  to the
sector by investing,  or not?
*  Finally, because  regulation  and ownership  are endogenous,  can their configuration  and
effectiveness  be explained,  at least in part, by changes  in Chile's political institutions  and interest
group pressure?
Analytically,  regulation  of prices and entry may or may not provide  adequate  price-based
incentives  for firms to expand. However, incentives--broadly  defined--are  also shaped  by2
institutions  (see, for example, North 1990; Williamson  1989). Accordingly,  the willingness  of
the private sector to invest  also depends  on whether  existing  safeguards  can prevent opportunistic
behavior  by the government  that would result in expropriation  of assets or quasi-rents. This point
is particularly  important  in telecommunications  because  asset specificity,  sunk cost and economies
of scale characterize  certain  segments  of that industry. The credibility  of safeguarding
institutions,  in turn, depends on political dynamics,  interest group pressures  and the degree of
independence  of the  judiciary. Therefore, a successful  regulatory  regime must reasonably  resolve
the two contractual  problems: between  government  and firms and between  government  and
interest groups.
Tnis analytical  framework  applies  to publicly owned telecommunications  companies  as well,
though with some modification. For example,  even when pricing rules are clearly stated,
managers  of public enterprises-because  they are appointed  and removed  by government-may be
unable or unwilling  to resist opportunistic  behavior  by the government,  in terms of translating
interest group pressure into cross-subsidization  and expropriation  of quasi-rents.  '/  Moreover,
under public ownership,  whether  investment  occurs depends  on the marginal  benefit from
expenditure  in the sector versus expenditure  on competing  projects. Thus, tight fiscal resources
and intense  competing  demands  on these resources  can result in neglecting  teleconunications
projects.
This paper argues that Chile, with its stable political institutions  and independent  judiciary
over a long period of time, has always had the capacity  to write credible contracts  and enforce
them.  The limited  success  of the contract  specific regulation  between 1930  and 1970  can be
traced to deficiencies  in the contracts  themselves,  particularly  with respect  to the rate of return on
investment  (until 1958) and the conditions  under which the govermnent  could intervene  in the
firm's operation. 2/  That contracts  were incomplete  can, in turn, be attributed  to the dominance
'I/ This point is referred  to as "political  interference"  in the literature  on public  enterprises. For more details,
see, for example, Shirley and Nellis (1991) and Galal (1991).
2/  The term "intervene"  is used in Chile (and here) to refer government  taking control of a private firn
without acquiring  ownership.3
of populist  policies and constituencies  who were little concerned  with luxurious  such as
telecommunications.  As for the limited  success  of publicly owned telecommunications  companies
in meeting  demand in the 1970s,  the cause seems to be a shift in ideology  toward reliance  on
market forces and the private sector, which curbed  public investment  at a time when private
business *as still undeveloped  to rely and depend intensely  on telecommunications  services. The
success  of the regulatory reforms of the 1980s  can be attributed  to the emergence  of a more
influential  private entrepreneurial  class and the spread of technological  changes that made
telecommunication  services  indispensable  for private sector development. 3 ;  These changes
prompted  the development  of relatively  efficient  regulatory regime, especially  regarding  tariffs.
Two important  policy implications  emerge from this analysis. First, regulatory reforms may
not take off at all or may prove ineffective  if they lack a strong constituency  for reform.  This
point is best illustrated  by the absence  of regulatory  reforms in telecommunications  until 1958 and
the ineffectiveness  of the initial refUrms. Second, the ability to write and enforce credible
contracts does not mean that the regulatory  details (tariff formulas,  entry rules, and the like) are
not also critical for success. This point is best illustrated  by the limited  development  of the
telecommnunications  sector in Chile between 1982  and 1987, when no tariff-setting  procedures
were specified.
Section  II of this paper analyzes  the regulatory  episodes  (or contracts  between government  and
firms) and ownership  patterns from 1930  until now. Section  III traces the effect of these
regulatory  episodes  (contracts)  on the performance  of the sector.  The following  section is
devoted to understanding  the relationship  between  political institutions,  credibility  of regulation
and sector development. Finally, the paper concludes  by drawing policy  conclusions  for the
design of effective  regulatory  schemes  elsewhere.
3/  As will be elaborated,  the late 1980s  also witnessed  an increase  in the cost of transactions  (in the form
of lawsuits) due to excessive deregulation.  But the cost of deregulation has to be weighed against that of
regulatory failure.4
II.  Regulatory  episodes  and ownership  palterns
Before  the Great Depression,  the govermnent  was little involved  in the telecommunications
sector except to grant concessions. The Chilean Telephone  Company  was the main provider of
telecommunications  services, with 26,205 telephones  in the entire country in 1927. Except
between Santiago  and Valparaiso,  Chile lacked communication  links between  cities and an
integrated  network. 4/
To integrate  different regions of the country and expand  coverage, Chile negotiated  a contract
with the Chilean Telephone  Company  (Law 4791/1930)  that led to the creation of Compafiia  de
Telefonos  de Chile (CTC) in 1930, of which ITT owned 80 percent.  In 1964  the government
created the Empresa  Nacional  de Telecomunicaciones  (ENTEL-Chile)  to provide  national  and
international  long-distance  services. The two companies  have dominated  the sector ever since.
Chile has adopted sharply different expressions  of commitment  to telecommunications  firms
over time that fall broadly  into three time periods:  1930-70,  1971-81,  and 1982-present.
Between 1930  and 1970  the government  relied on private ownership  and regulation  by specific
contract  for CTC and public ownership  and implicit  contract for ENTEL.  Between  1971 and
1981, the country relied on public ownership  of CTC and ENTEL. Starting in 1982, Chile
shifted to deregulation  of certain segments  of the market, better regulation  of others, and private
ownership. The remainder  of this section  analyzes  these episodes, with a special focus on three
key elements--concessions,  tariffs and means  of resolving  conflicts.
Firm-specific and sector regulation, 1930-70
Though other utilities  in Chile operated  under a general law issued in 1925, CTC operated
under a specific law (Law 4791/1930)  that remained  in effect until the government  intervened  in
the company's  operation in 1971. CTC's law detailed  its concessions,  tariffs, and conflict-
resolution  mechanisms. Under a 50-year  concession  CTC could provide  local and long-distance
4/  For a detailed  historical  perspective  of the evolution  of the sector  from inception  until now, see Melo
(1992).5
telephone  services  and supplementary  services. At the end of the period, the government  could
acquire the company,  but it had to purchase  the entire company  and pay the owners the value of
net fixed assets, excluding  intangibles,  expressed in pe-os-gold. Otherwise,  the concession  would
be automatically  extended  for 30 years, and, following  the same procedure, for similar periods
thereafter.
In return for the concession,  CTC was required to modernize  the network and connect certain
regions of the country. CTC was committed  to implement  a specific investment  program in
infrastructure  equipment,  plant, and extensions  over the next few years.  The company  was
committed  to estaolishing  connections  between  the Northern border and Puerto Montt within 10
years and between  Puerto Montt and Puerto Aysen  within 15 years.  Decisions  about integrating
other regions were left up to the company.
To help it meet its obligations,  CTC was given the right to buy other companies  throughout
the country. CTC could purchase  the companies  on its own or on the basis of a fair price
estimated  by three experts, one appointed  by each party and the third by the government.
Furthermore, CTC was allowed  a rate of return on net fixed assets of up to 10 percent.  If the
company  earned more than 10 percent, the excess profits were to be divided  equally between  the
national  treasury and the company. In addition, .he company  was allowed  to create a reserve
equal to 2 percent of net fixed assets, but not to exceed an accumulated  value of 20 percent of net
fixed assets.  Tariffs were indexed  to the value of the peso in gold at the time the concession  was
granted.  Price revisions  were left to the company's  board of directors, subject to government
objection  within 30 days.
To enforce the contract,  CTC was managed  by up to 15 directors, three of them appointed  by
the government. One of the govemment-appointed  directors  was the Director General  of Electric
Services; the other two were appointed  (and removed)  by the president. Disputes  between the
government  and the company  over the interpretation  of the concession  were to be resolved  by the
Supreme  Court, without  appeal.
The law stipulated  a few other provisions. For example,  Chilean nationals  were to constitute6
at least 80 percent of the cempany's staff.  The central government  and municipalities  were to
receive a 50 percent discount, Finally, the law gave the government  the right to intervene  in the
company's operation in cases of internal  disturbance  or external  conflicts. The government  was
obliged to compensate  the company  for any damage incurred in the process. In short, the
contract limited  government  discretion in terms of outright expropriation  of asset and relied on
the Supreme  Court for resolving  conflicts. It did, however, give the government  the right to
intervene  in the company's  operation under vaguely defined  c.rcumstances,  and it did not
guarantee  the company  a specific rate of return.
CTC met its initial investment  commitment. But, as time went by, expansion  slowed, and
ITT was accused  of inflating  costs. These factors prompted  the government  to enter into
subagreements  with CTC in 1958  and 1967. The 1958  agreement  ensured CTC a rate of return
of 10 percent on net fixed assets (instead  of up to 10 percent). In return, CTC agreed to an 8-
year investment  program.  Similarly,  by the terms of the 1967  agreement,  CTC pledged to
expand  the network  by 144,000  lines between 1967  and 1971, and to invest  sufficiently  after
1971 to increase the number  of lines by 6 to 7 percent a year.  Costs wet.. redefined, 5/ and
enforcement  was strengthened  by requiring  the approval  of the board of directors, including  at
least two of the government's  representatives,  for decisions  on such matters as fees for financial
and technical assistance  provided  by ITT and additions  to fixed assets.
The govcrnment  also used the 1967  agreement  to announce  its national  policy for
telecommunications.  The essence  of the new policy was that the government  would assume
control of the basic network in order to meet national  security  needs, to develop the
underdeveloped  regions of the country, and to guarantee  the provision  of efficient  national  and
international  telecommunication  services. The state holding  company,  CORFO, would purchase
up to 49 percent of the shares of CTC. 61/ A long-distance  market would be carved out for the
5/  For  example,  net fixed  assets  now  exclude  construction  in progress,  operating  capital  is estimated  as one-
sixth of gross annual revenue,  interest  on operating  capital is estimated  at 6 percent, and depreciation  is 5 percent.
6/  The purchase price was the book value of the shares in constant  gold-peso, converted into current pesos
at the annual weighted average of the monthly  exchange  rate.7
newly created state company, ENTEL. (See Agurto 1991).
The government  created ENTEL by decree 5487 in December 1964. Why it did so remains
unclear.  Explanations  range from meeting  the interests  of the army to facilitating  Chile's
participation  in the World Cup in 1962. Whatever  the explanation  for its creation, the company
was established  only to offer long-distance  services--even  though CTC's concession  was not
exclusive  and the government  had played a dominant  role in the economic  activity since 1930.
ENTEL operated under provisions  of the general law of electricity,  gas and
telecommunications  (DFL 4 of 1959), which governed  all utilities  except  CTC.  The terms of this
law were very similar to the terms of CTC's contract. Tariffs were to be set to allow the
company  a 10 percent return on the sunk cost of useful capital, defined as the replacement  cost of
construction,  plants, other fixed assets, and working capital; inrangible  assets were not to exceed
5 percent of the value of fixed  assets.  The Superintendency  of Electricity,  Gas and
Telecommunications  was responsible  for implementing  the law, and a new Tariff Commission  for
revaluing  net fixed assets. The commission  was composed  of the Superintendent  of Electric and
Gas Services  (as chair) and representatives  of the president, the Ministry of Economy,  CORFO,
and the National Planning  Office.
The law also stipulated  that tariffs would be revised  every five years, with interim  adjustment
for inflation. If the firm's rate of return exceeded  12 percent, the Superintendency  of Electric,
Gas and Telecommunicatiorns  Services  could set provisional  tariffs that would reduce excess profit
by 50 percent. Excess profits were to be deposited  in a special account, to be amortized  in the
case of profit shortfalls. If the rate of return fell below 10 percent, the firm could request  new
tariffs.
Reguaion  versus public ownership, 1971-81
Invoking  a clause of the 1930 law, the Allende  administration  intervened  in CTC's operatioan
in  1971. The 1930 law was revoked in 1973, and after that CTC operated  under the General
Law of 1959. In 1974, CORFO  acquired  the company  from ITT, despite the laisser-faire  policy8
of the military regime on almost all other economic  matters. Thus, during the 1970s  the
telecommunications  sector was dominated  by publicly owned enterprises. CTC provided  local
telephony throughout  the country,  except in regions X and XI and the Pascuas  Island (which were
served by the Compafifa  Nacional  de Telefonos,  the Compafhfa  de telefonos  de Coyhaique  and
ENTEL). ENTEL.  provided  national  and international  long-distance  services. And Correos and
Telegrafos  provided  domestic  telex and telegram  services, sharing the market for international
services  with ITT and Transradio.
Though CTC and ENTEL were both supposed  to operate under the regulatory  rules of 1959,
public ownership  made a big difference. For example,  under the system of concessions  laid out
in the law of 1959, any public or private corporation  could provide  any service, except for
domestic  telegrz:ph  and telex services. In practice, however, the government  assigned  public local
telephoiny  to CTC and long-distance  services  to ENTEL. Conflicts  between  CTC and ENTEL
were for the most part resolved.  by CORFO, their joint owner.  A fonner government  official
explained  that whenever  disputes escalated  between the two rivals, top management  of the two
companies  was shuffled around.
Similarly, the 1959 regulation  gave firms the right to earn a rate of return of 10 percent on
net fixed assets.  Yet during the 1970s  tariffs were often adjusted  below inflation,  especially  in
the early years of the decade. As a result, 'TC  and ENTEL lacked the resources  to expand,
develop  new products or adopt  new technologies. In addition, there was cross-subsidization
between local and long-distance  services, which intensified  the vertical and horizontal  integration
of the two government-owned  firms.
Finally, the 1959 regulation  vested regulatory  authority in the Superintendency  of Electricity,
Gas and Telecommunications  and the Tariff Commission. In practice, CORFO, as the owner of
the two companies,  played a more active  role.  Further, the top management  of both companies
was appointed  by the presidert largely from the ranks of the military. In 1977, when SUBTEL
had replaced  the Superintendency  of Electricity,  Gas and Telecommunications  and the Tariff
Commission  as a regulatory  agency in telecommunications,  the companies  were headed  by9
generals and SUBTEL  a colonel. Respect  for rank meant that the two companies  were essentially
left on their own.
In 1978, a new telecommunication  policy  was announced  that was more consistent  with the
laisser-faire  policy of the government  since 1973. The policy emphasized  the importance  of the
sector to economic  development,  the role of the private sector, and the need to eliminate  any
favorable  treatment of state enterprises. Several  other principles  were also announced. Public
services  of telecommunications,  radio-diffusion  and television  were normally to be provided  by
the private sector.  Concessions,  where required, would be granted on the basis of objective
criteria, specified  by law.  Tariffs would  be freely negotiated  between  the suppliers and clients,
except where markets were not competitive. Until 1982, however, this new policy remained
merely a statement  of intentions.
Deregulation and evolving regulation, 1982-present
Deregulation.  In 1982, Chile introduced  a new framework  for telecommunications,  based on
market principles. The General  Law of Telecommunications  (Law 18,168/1982)  places no
limitations  on the number of concessions  that can be granted to provide  a specific  service, expect
for technical  reasons. Concessions  are required only to provide local and long-distance  public
services, cellular telephony,  point-to-point  private transmission,  and private data transmission.
No concessions  are required  to provide yellow  pages, facsimile  services, sale and leasing of
telephone  and facsimile  equipment,  private exchanges,  and supplementary  services.
The General Law of 1982 stipulated  that interconnection  among  concession  holders of public
services is obligatory and must comply  with the technical  norms established  by SUBTEL. The
terns  of interconnections  were left to the parties themselves. Prices were to be determined  by
market forces, except where markets  were imperfect. In those cases, the rates would be set by
the Ministries  of Economy  and Telecommunications  on the basis of the direct and necessary  cost
of providing  the service.
The rules were quite sweeping, and in several important  areas they lacked adequate10
specificity. The law was ambiguous  about  the right of regulators  to refuse to grant concessions.
As a result, there was a proliferation  of concession  requests, especially  to provide the more
profitable  services. On tariffs, it was short on implementation.  Thus, tariffs continued  to be set
through informal  negotiations  between  the companies  and SUBTEL  and the Ministry of Economy.
Cross-subsidization  also persisted,  and prices remained  divorced from costs.  Finally, SUBTEL's
role was not well defined, nor did it have the resources  to perform all the tasks assigned  to it.
In effect, the new law provided  an implicit contract  that was too incomplete  to ensure
producers a fair rate of return on investment  or consumers  the right to have a phone within a well
specified  period.  Not surprisingly,  the regulatory  story since then has consisted  primarily of
attempts  to remedy  these deficiencies.
Further  adjustments  and  privatization. Several of these problems  were addressed in 1985.
The right of SUBTEL  to reject concession  applications  was clarified, and an arbitration  process
was introduced  to resolve  problems  of sharing  the cost of interconnections  between existing
companies  and newcomers. The role of SUBTEL  in resolving  legal, procedural  and technical
disputes among  service providers  and users was clarified.
The issue of universal service  and tariff setting were left unaddressed,  however, until 1987,
when the 1982 General  Law was modified  to prepare the way for the privatization  of CTC and
ENTEL. The new law (DFL 1 of 1987)  stipulated  that requests  for service must be satisfied
within  two years, though a 10-year  grace period was allowed,  given the backlog  of unmet
demand. To ease the financing  burden on the companies,  they were allowed  to request
reimbursable  financial  contributions  from customers  applying  for new telephones. The
contributions  could be reimbursed  in bonds, shares  of the company, or any other mutually  agreed
form.
Equally important,  the law introduced  a new tariff scheme (as explained  in Box 1) for local
and long-distance  fixed telephony, and an arbitration  process to settle disagreements  between the
firms and regulators. The law also defined  the criterion,  methodology,  procedures,  and timing
for tariff setting for local and long-distance  telephony,  as well as the agencies  in charge of settingthem.  Prices of all other services  were left to the determiination  of market forces.
The new tariff regimne  is theoretically  neat.  It is based on rate of return regulation  for a
theoretically  efficient firm. The incremental  cost of each service is first calculated,  given
projected  demand and operating and capital costs. The sum of these costs is equal to the long-run
marginal  cost, which--because  of economies  of scale--results  in a deficit. To recover cost and
induce expansion,  tariffs are adjusted  upward in such a way as to miinimize  distortions.
In 1988, CTC and ENTEL submiitted  their proposals  to the Ministries  of Teleconmmunications
and Economy  through SUBTEL. A new set of maximum  tariffs becamne  effective  in 1989, for
the next 5 years.  The rates phase out cross-subsidization  between  local and long-distance
services. CTC was allowed  a 12 percent rate of return, and ENTEL a 14 percent rate of return
because revenue  from long-distance  service is more volatile.
On-going/pending  re.forms. Two main problems  remain.  First, SUBTEL  is still a relatively
Box 1: Price  setting  procedures  for fixed  telephony
1.  Demand  Is  first  estimated  for  each  servlcelzOnefirn  -bundle,
2.  for each  service,  the  increentnal  cost  of  development  is'ther  calculated  based  on  t'he  conicept  of1  -affiCent.
firrn. The  Incremental  cost  of  development  Is'nothing  but  the  long-nn  marginal  most  -(t$hC,),adjusted  for
investment.  The  law  defines  -the  efficient  firm  as  one  that  alerts  :from  scratch  and  suses  only  the  afst"
necessary  to  provide  that  service.  It.fuirther  stioulates  that  rglated companie  -have.to  have:a-  minimum
of  5-year  Investment  program,  prepared  by  the  company  and  preseted  to  SUWfL  folioMn  the  detailed
outflne  specified  in  Law  18,168  (airtIce  30i).
3.  Revenue  Is  then  estimated  for  each  service,  sucb  that  the  net  present-  value  of  providing  the  service  is  equal
to  zero.  This  revenue-is  the-insrernntal  cost  of  developmant.
4.  To  move  from  the  incremental  cost  of  development  to  the  long-run  average  cost  (LRAC),  efficient  tariffs  are
Increased  In  a least  distorting  fashion  so  that  lfirs mnake  a fair  rate  of  return.
5.  The  fair  rate  of  return  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  the  rates  of  return  on  the  risk-free  assets  and  the  risk  premium
of  the  activty,  weighted  by  the  systematic  risk  of  the  Industry.  That  Is
= R,  + A,  (R,  - t)
where  P,  is  the  rate  of  return  on  revalued  capital  of  firm  I, R, 1Is  the  rate  of  return  on  risk-free  assets,  Ai  Is  firm
Vs  systematic  risk,  and  R,  is  the  rate  of  return  on  a diversified  investment  portfolio.
6.  Tariffs  are  recalculated  every  five  years,  so  the  law  allows  firms  to  adjust  tariffs  every  two  months,  using  the
Inflation  index  of  each  service  and  the  Divisia  Index.
1.  Disputes  between  companies  and  regulators  are  sefWe  by  a  committee  of  thre experts,  one  nominated  by
each  party  and  the  third  by  mutual  agreement.12
weak regulatory  body.  Unlike  other regulatory  agencies in Chile, SUBTEL  is neither financially
nor administratively  independent. It falls under the Ministry of Transportation  and
Telecommunications,  and its staff are subject  to the civil service  code.  The agency also lacks the
resources to undertake necessary  studies.  As a result, SUBTEL  has not been able to attract or
retain the right mix of skilled staff to handle its regulatory  functions  effectively.
The second problem concerns  market segmentation. CTC and ENTEL had been able to
coexist relatively peacefully  for a long time, la,-gely  because  both firms were owned by the
government. However,  the competitive  relationship  between  the two companies  intensified
dramatically  following  their privatization  in 1988  and 1989. Both firms are trying to maximize
profit, but the long- distance market is more lucrative  than the local market.  This rivalry is
causing  costly disputes (as will be discussed  below), and efforts are being made to address these
problems, in part by introducing  a multi-carrier  system in the long-distance  market.
Summary
Chile has experimented  broadly speaking  with three regulatory  regimes  and ownership
patterns in telecommunications.  Though  different in many ways, they shared several features:
rate of return regulation.  free entry, and explicit  conflict  resolution  mechanisms,  whether for
tariffs, or end-of-concession  compensation. The main differences  between these regulatory
regimes are as follows. Up till 1958, firms were not ensured a specific rate of return, nor were
they guaranteed  that the government  would not intervene  in their operations. The first deficiency
was corrected in 1958, but the latter remained  in effect and was used by the government  to take
over the operation  of CTC in 1971. In the 1970s,  though the regulatory  rules of 1958 were
reasonably  well conceived,  they were not applied  in practice  because  both CTC and ENTEL were
publicly owned. Only in the 1980s  did the government  combine  private ownership  with relatively
efficient regulatory  regime, though some market boundaries  were left unidentified. One of the
most interesting  and innovative  features  of this regulatory  regime is benchmark  regulation.13
II.  Consequences of regulatory reforms
How did these regulatory  episodes  affect the development  of the telecommunications  sector?
In particular, what effect did they have on services,  prices, returns on investment,  and overall
welfare? And, what effect did the lack of definition  of market boundaries  in recent reforms have
on the behavior of firns?
Services,  prices, profit and economic welfare
Telecommunications  services. Whatever  measure  of telephone  expansion  is used--numbers  of
telephones,  installed  lines, lines in service, density, automatization  and digitalization,  or
investment--expansion  is most dramatic  in the 1980s  and lowest in the 1970s  (figures 1 through
4).  The number of telephones  grew at an annual rate of nearly 9 percent during 1981-91,  but at
only 4 percent during 1971-81  (table 1).  In the period before 1970, network expansion  was
uneven, proceeding  fairly rapidly  at 7.3 percent a year in 193448, slowing  to 2.6 percent in
1948-57,  and picking up again to 6.8 percent in 1957-70. As would  be expected,  pending
applications  for telephone  installations  (as a share of lines in service) were high in the periods
preceding  expansion. Somewhat  unexpectedly,  pending  applications  have increased  in recent
years, even as the network was being doubled,  reflecting  a surge in demand  and higher
expectation  by consumers  of getting a telephone  installed.
Table 1. Telephone  expansion  in Chile, 1934-91
(annual  growth rates)
1934-60  1960-70  1971-81  1981-91
Telephone  in service  5.6  6.7  4.2  8.9
Line  in service  N.A.  7.5  3.9  9.9
1960  1970  1981  1991
Telephone  applications
(% of Lines  in service)  54  25  42  24
Telephone  density  2.7  4.1  5.4  10.8
Source:  CTC.Figure  1  Number  of Telephones  in Service  (CTC),  1934-91
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The same pattern emerges  for national  and international  long-distance  services, (figures 5 and
6).  There was a dramatic  increase in these services  following  ENTEL's privatization  and CTC's
expansion. In that sense, it can be said that ENTEL's sale to the private sector relaxed the
resource  constraint experienced  under public ownership  and that CTC's expansion  made it
possible for a larger number  of consumers  to make long-distance  calls.
There was also an explosion  of value-added  services  in the 1980s,  and in the number  of
providers of these services. Consumers  now enjoy a number  of new services such as paging,
mobile telephony, and data transmission. CTC-Cellular  and CIDCOM  provide  mobile telephony
services in the Santiago  metropolitan  region and Region  V, and VTR-Cellular  and Telecom-
Cellular serve the rest of the country. Intemational  communications  are provided  by two
interrelated  firms, Telex-Chile  and TEXCOM, and by VTR and ITT World communications.
VTR, Chile-Pac, and ECOM provide  data transmission. Finally, there has been a huge
expansion  in the market for equipment,  including  telephone  sets, modems,  private exchanges, and
other consumer  premises  equipment.
In short, the regulatory  reforms of the 1980s  coincided  with the period of fastest expansion  of
the network, and provision  of new services. Public ownership  and tight fiscal policy effectively
blocked expansion  in the 1970s. And in the preceding years, CTC slacked off once it had
fulfilled its contractual  obligations  of the 1930s  until its contract  was modified in 1958 to ensure a
10 percent rate of return.
Prices. Establishing  price trends for telecommunications  services  over long periods is
difficult  because prices differ in their composition  between  fixed and variable charges, for peak
and off-peak  periods, and flat and metered  systems. Nevertheless,  certain observations  can be
made about price trends, using available  data (figures 7 and 8).  The real prices of local services
declined in the early 1970s,  following  Allende's election.'/  Prices picked up in 1974 and have
been on the rise ever since with the exception  of 1984. Real prices of long- distance  services
also declined  in the early 1970s,  and this trend has persisted  ever since. Both trends reflect
continuing  efforts to reduce  cross-subsidization  from national  and international  long-distance
services  to local services, and from commercial  to residential  subscribers. This effort began in
1981 by gradually  replacing  the flat rate system by the metered  system, but not until 1989  did the
price schedule  formally incorporate  the complete  phaseout  of cross-subsidization  (table 2).
7/  Real prices are obtained using the consumer  price index, with 1977 as the base year.Figure  5 National  and Internabonal  Telecommunications  Traffic  (ENTEL),  1973  - 91
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In short, with the exception  of the early 1970s,  prices of local services  kept up, and even
surpassed, inflation. In the market for long-distance  services, prices have been declining
consistently  in real terms, largely to eliminate  cross-subsidization.  The question  is whether these
t3riffs provided  firms with adequate  returns on their investment.
Table 2.  Telephone  price schedule, 1989-93
(September 1989 rates  =  100)
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Local  metered  service
Monthly charge  100  123  138  154  171
Variable charge  100  100  100  100  100
Local flat rate service  100  114  125  136  147
National long-distance  100  80  74  65  65
International long-distance  100  100  100  100  100
Allocation fee  100  82  25  12  0
Source:  CTC.
Profit.  Since 1958, firms have been assured a rate of return of 10 percent--even  higher since
1989--on  the sunk cost of useful capital. However, trends of profitability  on revalued assets
reveal significant  differences  between  CTC and ENTEL, and over time (figures 9 and 10).8/ To
the extent that the reported rates of return are believable,  several observations  can be made.
CTC's rates of return were positive in the 1960s,  but below 10 percent. In the early 1970s,  the
company  even made losses. Only in the period  following  privatization  in 1988  did CTC have
rates of return higher than 10 percent.  ENTEL, by contrast, consistently  had rates of return of
more than 10 percent in the 1980s. In recent years, the company's  rates of return have even
exceeded  40 percent on revalued  assets, despite  the decline  in its prices.
The rates of return on revalued  assets have to be interpreted  with caution, however. They
underestimate  the rates of return actually  received  by the companies  by the extent to whiclh  the
denominator  is inflated  by t' .m.  Nor can these rates be used to establish  whether  CTC and
ENETL received  the 12 and 14 percent rates of return to which they have been entitled since
1989 because  they are based on revenue  from both regulated  and unregulated  services. 9/
8/ No information  could be obtained  before 1960 for CTC and before 1979 for ENTEL.
9/  It was not possible to correct  for these factors.Figure  9 Return  on Net Fixed  Assets,  1960  - 90
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CTC's rates of return on networth  approached  or exceeded  10 percent during the 1960s  and
1980s, except in 1982 (figure 10).  Under public ownership  in the 1970s, CTC's rates of return
were even negative  early in the decade.  As for ENTEL, recent data for the 1980s  indicate  that
the company  has had rates of return far higher than any reasonable  return on investment  in
teleconmnunications.  This windfall  profit is due largely to revenue  from international  incoming
calls.
Overall change  in welfare. Consumers  can be said to be better off the larger the network, the
better the quality of service, and the lower the price, and producers  to be better off the higher the
tariffs and the greater the return on investment. Competition  would  be expected  to reduce returns
for competitors,  and expansion  of the network  would be expected  to benefit providers of
complementary  services. An assessment  of the welfare impact  of regulatory  reforms must sum
up these effects to reach a bottom line conclusion.
This kind of analysis  has been perforned for CTC: the social net present  value of CTC under
private operation  was subtracted  from its simulated  value under continued  public ownership  (Galal
and others, forthcoming). The analysis  concluded  that privatization  and regulation  in the 1980s
improved  the welfare  of Chileans, as well as foreigners  (table 3).  Consumers  were the biggest
winners, but shareholders,  government,  and interestingly,  ENTEL (which benefitted  from CTC's
expansion)  also gained.
Table 3.  Welfare  effects of privatizing  CTC
(1988 net present values; billions  of pesos)
CTC  Net  gains
Under  private  Under  public  from
operation  operation  privatization
Government  97  64  33
Domestic  shareholders  19  11  8
Consumers  1104  588  516
Competitors  43  27  16
Total  domestic  welfare  1263  690  574
Foreign  Shareholders  39  0  39
Total  world  welfare  1301  689  612
Source:  Galal  and others  (forthcoming  1994).22
While no similar analysis  exists for ENTEL, a broad conclusion  based on the partial
indicators  noted above is that ENTEL's expansion  and lower tariffs must have benefitted
consumers. Yet, ENTEL's excessive  rates of return indicate  that consumers  could have done
much better.  Alternatively,  government  could have spent the windfall  gains from incoming  calls
to expand  rural telephony  or other similar  projects.
Anticompetive  behavior and transaction costs
Notwithstanding  these positive  effects, the recent regulatory  reforms and privatization  have
also resulted  in a large number  of lengthy  and costly lawsuits  alleging  anticompetitive
behavior.'°/ Several factors  lie behind  these claims, including  an excessive  reliance  on market
forces to define market boundaries,  the drive for profit maximization  following  privatization,  the
industry's large sunk costs, and strong incentives  for vertical integration,  cross subsidization,  and
cream skimming. Whatever  the motives, these lawsuits  have increased  the transaction  costs of
conducting  business  and burdened  the courts.  A few cases are briefly reviewed  below, to
illustrate  the nature of these disputes and how conflicts are resolved.
Local  fixed telephony. To promote competition  and private sector participation,  SUBTEL
granted  concessions  to a number  of small companies  in 1981  to provide  local fixed telephony
services in certain regions of the country, some of them overlapping  with CTC's concession
areas.  These firms filed several  antitrust complaints,  accusing  CTC of infringing  on fair
competition.'  II  The Commissions  ruled against CTC for anticompetitive  behavior in all
instances, according  to Coloma  and Herrera (1990).12/  But the costs incurred in the process
'°/  For an analysis of these disputes,  see Coloma and Herrera (1990) and Parades (1987). For a review of
disputes under Chile's first antitrust law of 1959,  see Furnish, (1971).
"/  These firms also suffered  from inefficient  plant size.  The extent of economies  of scale -in  Chile has been
studied by the Economics Department  of the University of Chile (1987), and descrilbed  in Ale (1989).  These
studies show that the elasticity of total cost with respect to output varies between 0.5 and 0.95, depending  on
plant size.
12/  According  to Decree Law  211 of 1973,  conflicts  pertaining  to anticompetitive  behavior  are resolved first
by the thirteen Regional Preventive Commissions  at the local level, and then by the Resolutive  Commission.
Decisions of the Preventive Commissions  can be appealed to the Resolutive Commission and finally to the
Supreme Court.  To ensure neutrality, the Resolutive  Commission  is made of five members: the Chief of the
Supreme  Court as chair (appointed  by his tribunal),  two government  representatives  (appointed  by the Ministers
of Economy  and Finance),  and a dean  of a law school  and of an economics  department  (selected  at random). The
members of this commission  remain in office for two years.23
could have been avoided  had the market for local fixed telephony  been better defined  to avoid
overlapping  concessions.
Most of the complaints  concerned interconnections.  In general, a new firm is required to
provide transmission  and switching  equipment  to interconnect  its customers  and to connect its
network with other companies. This entails investment  by the new company  in the local network
and investment  by the new and existing  companies  in interconnection. Interconnection  costs are
shared by agreement  between  the parties involved  sub.,ect  to rules set by SUBTEL. The problem,
of course, is that the incumbent  is not likely to negotiate  in good faith because  of an inherit
conflict  of interest. Thus, even after agreement  is reached on cost-sharing,  CTC can still fin(
plausible reasons  to delay installation.
Long-distance  markets. The same weakness  affected  the market for long-distance  services.
The government  could  have anticipated  in the early 1980s  the lack of compatibility  between  free
competition  (and multiple  concessions)  and the absence  of a multi-carrier  system in the long-
distance  market.  Failure to recognize  this problem  led, following  the privatization  of CTC and
ENTEL, to a lengthy and costly lawsuit  that is still working its way through the judicial system.
The story began in June 1989  when CTC applied-through  its subsidiary  CTC-Transmisiones
Regionales  S.A.-for  a concession  to provide  domestic  long distance  services  through satellite
links.  In September 1989, CTC also applied  for a concession  to provide domestic long-distance
services  in the Santiago-Valparaiso  and Santiago-Temuco  markets  through a fiber optics cable
system. ENTEL objected  to CTC's applications,  arguing  that the concessions  would give CTC
monopoly  influence.' 3/  CTC replied that its participation  would enhance  competition  and
introduce  advanced  technology  in the sector.
SUBTEL referred the matter to the Fair Trade Enforcement  Office, requesting  a ruling on the
following  questions:  How would  competition  be affected  by vertical integration? Can the local
and long-distance  services  be considered  different markets? And should local companies  be
prevented  from participating  in the long-distance  market?
In October 1989  the Preventive  Commission,  the first tier in the dispute-resolution  process,
13/  In retaliation, ENTEL's subsidiary, Global Telecommuncaciones  S.A., applied in April  1989 for
concessions  to provide local service in specific business sectors of Santiago. CTC accused ENTEL of cream
skimming,  arguing  that the Telecommunications  Law does not allow a concession holder to carve out a specific
area within an existing concession  for a new concession. CTC also objected to the tariff system to be applied,
arguing that the guidelines for the tariffs must be similar to CTC's.  This dispute is still pending. Meanwhile,
SUBTEL  has suspended  the decision  to grant the concessions  to ENTEL.24
issued  a ruling that went against  CTC, declaring  that local companies  could not participate  in the
long-distance  market (and long-distance  companies  could not enter the local market).  CTC's
preexisting long-distance  concessions  (including  the Santiago-Vaiparaiso  radio link and the
Santiago-Buin  radio link) were exempted  from this decision. In November 1989  the Resolutive
Commission,  the second  tier in the process, issued  a ruling  favorable  to CTC.  This ruling
stipulated  that local companies  could enter the long-distance  market and long-distance  companies
could enter the local service market if two conditions  were met: the Lompany  entering the new
market creates a subsidiary  for that purpose  (to identify  transfer costs) and the local company
modifies  its system (at its expense)  to provide  interconnection  with all long-distance  carriers
through a multi-carrier  system.
ENTEL appealed  the second ruling to the Supreme  Court in December 1989. In May 1990,
the Supreme  Court returned  the case to the Resolutive  Commission,  without  reviewing  ENTEL's
appeal on the merits, on the grounds  that the commission  had not adequately  investigated  the
feasibility  of implementing  a multi-carrier  system, or the effect on competition. The court
ordered the Resolutive  Commission  to conduct  an in-depth  study. In meantime,  the government
has developed  a draft law to introduce  a multi-carrier  system.
Summary
After an initial  boost in the 1930s,  growth of the network  was sluggish,  prompting  the
government  to conclude  various subcontracts  with CTC and to create ENTEL to provide long-
distance services. Apparently,  this tentative  game came to halt in the early 1970s,  when the
government  decided  to play on its own. But the sector grew even more modestly  than before.
During this decade, the regulatory  rules were clear, but rarely applied. Tariffs were highly
politicized,  particularly  at the beginning  of the decade. Investment  was constrained  by fiscal
considerations. Finally, in the 1980s  the rules changed  again, with greater reliance  on market
forces, better regulation,  and private ownership  all spurring  development  in the sector.
Deregulation  and re-regulation  during this period produced  significant  net benefits  for the
economy, as services expanded  and a variety of new services  were introduced. However,
disputes erupted, increasing  the transaction  costs of business. There are trade-offs  involved  here:
these costs have to be weighted  against  the benefits  of having  flexibility  to cope with rapidly
changing  technology. Specifying  boundaries  more strictly would probably  have institutionalized25
inefficiencies  since the government  is unlikely  to have anticipated  technological  changes.
IV.  Credibility of and demand for regulation
Interesting  as it may be, the discussion  thus far does not address  the puzzle as to why Chile
only opted to introduce  relatively  efficient  regulation  in recent years, or why this regulatory
regime was perceived  to be credible  by the private sector. Clearly, regi,lation  does not develop
in isolation. The credibility  of regulatory contracts  depends  not only on the transparency  and
incentives  built into tariff formulas  and entry rules, but also on the nature of political institutions
and the independence  of the judiciary--the  government-firm  contracting  problem. In turn,
regulation  is shaped by interest group demands  and other factors--the  government-interest-group
contracting  problem. Both issues  are explored  below.
Political institutions and the judiciary
Chile has experienced  dramatic  political changes  over the past two decades. In 1970, the
country  elected Allende  as President,  the first free election  of a socialist-Marxist  in world history.
Three years later, the military overthrew  the Allende  administration,  and Augusto  Pinochet took
power until the election  of Patricio Aylwin, a Christian  Democrat, in 1989. These events of the
1970s  and 1980s  give the impression  that the political institutions  in Chile are unstable, which
would, if true, diminish  the credibility  of regulation  as a protection  against  expropriation  of asset-
specific utilities  such as telecommunications.  In a longer-term  perspective,  Chile's political
institutions  appear far more stable, suggesting  that Chile could  have written credible contracts and
enforced them at any time.
Political institutions. Chile became  independent  from Spain in 1818  and adopted its first
constitution  in 1883.'4/ The constitution  embodied  the principles of separation  of powers,
orderly transfer of government,  and regular parliamentary  elections. With brief exceptions,  Chile
has maintained  its multiparty  system and a full range of civic and political rights.  As a result,
Chile has elected  presidents  of diverse political  persuasions  (seen table 4).'5/
14,  Two other constitutions followed,  in 1925, and in 1980  (amended in 1989).
'5/ Historically,  the Liberal  and Conservative  parties represented  the interests  of the right, mainly  landowners,
industrialists,  importers  and some professionals. The Radical  party represented  the interests  of the Center, whose
constituency was drawn from civil servants, school teachers, and urban middle class.  The Communist and
Socialist  parties represented  the left, whose main support came from the miners, industrial  workers, some in the26
To illustrate  the resilience  of Chile's political institutions,  consider  two examples. When
Allende  won the election in 1970, the opposition  (mainly  the Christian  Democrats)  feared that the
new administration  would change  Chile's political institutions. Allende  has received  only 36.6
percent of the votes, just slightly  more than Jorge Alessandri's 35.2 percent.  When no candidate
receives  a majority  of the vote, the constitution  assigns  Congress  the selection  of the president,
normally the candidate  with the largest share of the popular  vote.  This time, however, because
of concern  for the country's political institutions,  the Christian  Democrats  agreed to support
Allende  in exchange  for a number of congressionally  mandated  constitutional  amendments,  known
as the Statute  of Democratic  Guarantees. The amendments  affirmed, for example,  the right to
free association  in political parties, and equal access to state-controlled  media.  Newspapers  could
be expropriated  only by a law approved  by an absolute  majority  of both houses of Congress. As
it turned out, these safeguards  provided  formidable  obstacles  to efforts by the Allende
administration  to change the country's political institutions.
Pinochet  tried to do the same thing. Three years after the military  take over, the Junta
appointed  a council of state to reshape  Chile's political institutions. A new constitution  was put
to a plebiscite  and passed in 1980. It gave Pinochet  an 8-year  term.  The constitution  stipulated
that a new plebiscite  would be held before the end of March 1989  to determine  whether  to select
a candidate  proposed  by the junta for 8 more years.  Further, a new Congress  was then to be
elected, for the first time since 1973. In 1989, Chileans  voted no to another term for Pinochet.
Later that year, they elected  a new president  (Aylwin)  and a new Congress, returning  to
democracy.  16/  It can be argued  that this shock  provided  reasons for consensus  and reconciliation.
lower-middle  class and the intelligentsia. Over time, the Christian Democratic  party grew partly at the expense
of the Radicals,  partly by attracting  a large number of the middle  class, and partly by incorporating  new voters,
particularly  peasants and urban squatters. Election  outcomes  have largely depended on whether the center and
right were united or split.
16/  One legacy of the 1980 constitution,  however, is that the executive branch has the right to appoint 8
senators, in addition to the 26 senators  elected by popular  vote.  This provision  was intended  at the time to give
the conservative  forces an edge and prevent the country from ever returning to socialism.27
Table 4.  Popular  votes in Chilean  presidential  elections, 1952-89
Year  Candidate (party  or coalition)  Percent of
vote
1952  Carlos Ibanez (Independent)  46.8
Arture Matte  (Right:  Conservative, Liberal)  27.8
Pedro E, Alfonso (Center:  Radical)  19.9
Salvador Allende  (Left:  Socialist)  5.5
1958  Jorge Alessandri  (Right:  Conservative, Liberal)  31.6
Salvador Allende (Left:  Socialist, Communist)  28.9
Eduardo Frie (Center:  Christian Democrat)  20.7
Luis Bossay  (Center:  Radical)  15.6
Antonio Zamorano (Independent:  Left)  3.3
1964  Eduardo Frei  (Center-Right:  Christian Democrat,
Conservative, Liberal)  56.1
Salvador Allende (Left:  Socialist, Communist)  38.9
Julio Duran  (Center-Right,  Radical)  5.0
1970  Salvador Allende  (Left:  Socialist, Communist,
MAPU, Radical Left)  36.6
Jorge Alessandri  (Right:  Independent,  National)  35.2
Radomiro Tomic  (Center:  Christian Democrat)  28.1
1989  Patricio Aylwin,  (Center-Left:  Christian
Democrat, Radical, Socialist, PPD)  53.8
Hernan Buchi  (Right:  UDI)  28.7
F. J. Errazuriz  (Center:  Independent)  15.0
Source:  1952-70: Falcoff (1989);  1989: Mendez  (1990).
Notwithstanding  the resilience  of Chile's political institutions  in general, Chilean politics
between 1925  and 1973 made it possible for a president to be elected  by a minority of the
electoral vote."/  Of the five presidents  elected between 1946  and 1973, only one was elected  by
an absolute  majority--and  even then, only because  the right-wing  candidate  withdrew  from the
race.  As a result, the president  had to face an opposing  majority  in Congress. The tension
between the two branches  of government  escalated  following  the constitutional  reforms of 1958,
which reduced the room for bargaining  by abolishing  joint electoral lists to eliminate  corrupt
deals among candidates  of different  parties at the local level (Shagart  and Carey 1992).
What are the implications  for the credibility  of regulatory  contracts  of the stability  of political
"/  From 1891  to 1925,  Chile  had a hybrid  of a presidential,  parliamentary,  and assembly  (congress)  type
of government:  presidential  because  a president  with some executive  power was elected  every five years,
parliamentary  because  the cabinet  remained  in power  only  as  long  as it was  supported  by  the majority  of congress,
and a government  of congress  (assembly)  because  the legislative  branch  had  the  greatest  power.  The  era  was  also
characterized  by a highly  fragmented  political  party system  dominated  by conservative  forces.  For details
regarding  the Chilean  politics  before  1925,  see Arriagada  (1984).28
institutions,  but the inherent need for compromise  between  the president  and Congress? Both
would be expected  to enhance the credibility  of contracts--the  general stability  of political
institutions  for obvious  reasons, the need for compromise  between  the executive  and the
legislative branches  because  it makes  laws difficult  to change."I/
The judiciary  system versus government discretion.  Chile has a tradition of an independent
judiciary system that has restrained  government  discretion  in the areas of property rights and
contracts. The agrarian reform of the 1960s  and the natioLalization  of enterprises  of the early
1970s  well illustrate  this judicial independence. Under the constitution  of 1925, the government
had to pay for expropriated  land in cash.  Lacking  the resources to meet this provision, the
government  passed a law in 1963 allowing  compensation  to be paid over a 10-year  period at an
annual interest rate of 4 percent, and indexing  the payments  for inflation. The law established  a
government  agency (CORA) to oversee  the evaluation  and expropriation  of property, and a
system of land tribunals to settle differences  between  the agency  and landowners. The decisions
of these courts were subject  to appeal  through the regular court system.
As for the nationalization  of enterprises  during the Allende  administration,  it is true that
Chile's 1925  constitution  permitted expropriation  "when the interests  of the national  community
so require" (article 10). However, the constitution  also specified  the limits on such action,
stating that expropriating  property required "a general or special law which authorizes  the
expropriation  for reasons of public utility or social interest, as defined by the legislation. The
expropriated  party will always  have the right to compensation,  fairly determined,  taking into
account the interests of both the commnunity  at large and the expropriated  parties."  To go around
this provision, the Allende  administration  used an almost  forgotten  decree (law 520 of 1932)  that
allowed the president  to intervene  temporarily  in the operation  of certain industries  under vaguely
defined conditions-for example,  when producers "of basic necessity"  ceased  production or
"unjustifiably"  produced  an inadequate  supply.
The administration  used the decree extensively,  but Congress  refused to give the president  the
legal mandate  needed  to back up these requisitions. In the meantime,  the comptroller  general
repeatedly  invalidated  these actions. In April 1972, the judiciary declared  the seizure of several
factories by their workers to be invalid. By late 1972, relations  between  the administration  and
`8/ Unlike  Jamaica,  for example,  where  the  president  can  change  laws  relatively  easily  because  he is always
backed  by a majority  in parliament.  See Spiller  and Sampson  (1993).29
the Supreme  Court were severely  strained, with the administration  insisting  on the validity  of its
actions, and the court just as firmly insisting  otherwise. In the following  year, the deadlock was
resolved  by the military overthrow  of the Allende  regime.
Distributional  demands and other  factors
If the stability  of political institutions,  the nature of Chilean politics, and the independence  of
the judiciary system meant that the country  could at any time have written and enforced  credible
contracts for the telecommunications  sector, why were the regulatory  reforms so much more
successful  in the 1980s  than before? The question  can be explored  from two sides.
Why earlier reforms were less successful.  Perhaps the most important explanatory factor is a
difference  in constituencies. Demand  for telecommunications  services  from the 1930s  through the
1970s  had come almost entirely  from the wealthiest  classes, whereas Chilean politics  until 1973
catered for the low- and middle income  classes.  As did other Latin American  countries, Chile
followed  a strategy of industrialization  through import  substitution,  price control, and direct
ownership  of important  economic  activities. Within this framework,  the government  not only
intervened  in health, housing, and education,  but also in electricity, fertilizer, and steel.
Telecommunications,  however, was left to the private sector, which is not surprising  given that
policy formulation  between 1938  and 1952  was in the hands of the Radical  party, which drew its
constituency  primarily  from civil servants, school teachers, and the urban middle class.
The government's interventionist  mode  continued  into the 1950s,  culninating in an economy
brought to its knees by acute inflation  and a foreign  debt crisis.  In response, Chileans  elected
Jorge Alessandri, a Liberal, in 1958. President  Alessandri  proposed  a program of fiscal restraint,
credit restrictions, a unified exchange  rate, and import liberalization  to keep inflation  down. He
also proposed to free prices and promote competition. However,  because  the Radicals were the
largest party in Congress  at that time, Alessandri  had to compromise  by submitting  reforms that
supplemented  rather than supplanted  previous  policies. In the telecommunications  sector, reforms
fell short as well.  CTC's contract was improved  in 1958  by defining  the company's  rate of
return, but the contract remained  incomplete  in its failure to resolve  the threat of government
intervention.
The Christian Democrats  won the election  in 1964, returning in large measure to policies in
the Radical  mold. During their term, Chile experienced  a wave of nationalization
(Chileanization)  and agrarian reform. These were not surprising  policies for a party that since its30
inception  in 1941  had grown partly at the expense  of the Radicals  and partly by incorporating
new voters, particularly  peasants  and urban squatters. Nor is it surprising  that the 1967
agreement  with CTC stipulated  the sale of 49 percent of the company  to CORFO, rather than
canceling  the clause that permits govermnent  intervention.
Two other factors also contributed  to the relative  neglect of the telecommunications  sector
until the late 1970s. The technology  had not yet advanced  to the point where telecommunications
services were essential for business,  as they are today.  Also the private sector was still relatively
modest in size and influence,  and small business  shared, to a large extent, the values of landlord
oligarchy, because of cultural homogeneity  and a perceived  common  economic  interest with large
business.
Why recent regulatory  reforms  have been more successful. The military regime that ruled
Chile between 1973  and 1989 introduced  sweeping  structural reforms in the economy  that still
shape it today.  The foundation  of this policy is an open economy,  in which market forces and
the private sector are the main pillars.  The government  introduced  substantial  trade and price
liberalization  and privatized  public enterprises,  banks, pension funds, and even health and
education  delivery. For public enterprises  that were not privatized,  operations  were
commercialized,  and a number of regulatory  reforms  were introduced. While all these reforms
were taking shape, the telecommunications  sector continued  to lag.
Reform of the telecommunications  sector gained momentum  in the 1980s, with notable
success. Several  reasons account for the charge.  Broad support emerged  during this period for
better telecommunications  services. Much of this demand  arose from a larger, more
entrepreneurial  private sector and coincided  with an increase in importance  of telecommunications
services  for businesses.
To be sure, the ruling  coalition  under the military  regime consisted  mainly  of members of the
armed forces and the traditional  upper classes. However, with the help of a group of economists
(known  as Chicago  boys for their neoclassical  leanings),  policies of economic  liberalization,
retrenchment  of public sector employment,  and privatization  helped create an important  class of
entrepreneurs,  made up of small businesspeople,  shopkeepers,  and farmers, as well as larger
entrepreneurs.  19/  What makes  the new bourgeoisie  an important  influence  in the
`9/ According to Valde  (1989), the technocratic  elite represented  the political counterpart  of the emerging
class of entrepreneurs. From their policymaking  positions, the Chicago Boys supported the private sector in
numerous ways, including  simplifying  the custom  systems  and providing  the necessary  credit to start up business.31
telecommunications  sector is that it includes  these new groups: members  of the middle-class  who
turned from public sector emplovment  to other employee  positions  to become entrepreneurs, in
commerce, transportation,  and services; local entrepreneurs,  who formed partnerships  with
international  investors in new conglomerates  in such dynamic  activities  as fishing, fruits, wood,
paper, and mining; and market entrepreneurs,  in the area of agricultural  exports and other areas
(Montero, 1990). Collectively,  the three groups of entrepreneurs  constitute  an important  political
force in Chile.  And they--and  every other important  economic  agent--depend  heavily dependent
on telecommunications  to remain competitive.
V.  Conclusion
This paper analyzed  the relationship  between  the performance  of the telecommunications
sector in Chile, the successive  regulatory  episodes  and the factors that lent credibility of
contracts. It argued that, before 1958, CTC's contract  left too many important  details uncovered
to persuade  the company  to invest adequately. That deficiency  eventually  led the government  to
better define the contract  and to create its own telephone  company  to provide long-distance
services. Throughout  this period, the government's  lack of interest in the growth of the sector
stemmed  from the fact that those most interested  in expanding  telecommunications  services  were
not important  voting  blocks.  In the 1970s  the government  substituted  public for private
ownership  to resolve  problems in the sector, but the new arrangement  led to an even slower
growth, which was attributable  to a shift in ideology  toward the private sector, tight fiscal policy,
and the limited demand for telecommunications  services  by a small but growing private sector.
Beginning  in the 1980s  and continuing  today, technological  changes  and the emergence  of a
stronger business  class provided  the impetus  for developing  the sector. Correspondingly,  the
sector grew substantially,  with privatization  providing  needed  fresh capital and better regulation
providing a fair rate of return to the private sector. The credibility  of contracts in Chile derives
from the country's long standing  tradition  of stable  political institutions  and independent
judiciary. The specificity  and fairness of the regulatory  rules, and the difficulty  of changing  the
laws also contribute.
Notwithstanding  the success  of the recent regulatory  reforms in stimulating  expansion  and
increasing  welfare, it was argued that Chile could  have done better by more clearly defining
market boundaries  and strengthening  its regulatory  bodies, thereby reducing  the transaction  costs
resulting  from dispute  settlements  in courts.  The counterargument  is that specifying  market32
boundaries  could have resulted in inefficient  contracts, because  government  could  have erred in
anticipating  technological  changes. In view of the difficulty  in changing  laws in Chile, the cost
of such commitment  could have been high.
The analysis of the experience  of the telecommunications  sector in Chile supports the
following  hypotheses:
*  Stable political institutions  and independent  judiciary increase the capacity of governments
to write credible contracts  and enforce them.  However,  this is a necessary but not sufficient
condition; It takes effective interest group pressure  to get governments  to act.  Short of such
pressure, reform attempts to develop the telecommunications  sector may fail.
* Private sector investment  depends not only on the credibility  of contracts, but also on
specific regulations  and conflict resolution  mechanisms  governing  such important  issues as
tariffs and enftry  rules.  Failure to specify such regulations  may preclude private sector
commitment  in the first place.
* Deregulation  and privatization  require clear conflict resolution  mechanisms  and antitrust
legislation,  especially where governments  do not want to lock themselves into a specific market
configuration  because laws are difficult to change.33
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